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DEFENDING AGAINST A STOCKPILING TERRORIST
Kjell Hausken and Jun Zhuang
A government defends against a terrorist who attacks repeatedly and 
stockpiles its resources over time. The government defends an asset and 
attacks the terrorist’s resources. The terrorist defends its resources and 
attacks the government. We find four possible equilibrium solutions:
(1) the government attacks only, deterring the terrorist; (2) both players 
defend and attack; (3) the government defends but does not attack, and 
the terrorist attacks only; and (4) the terrorist attacks a passive govern-
ment. Understanding which factors impact the four cases is important in 
order to combat terrorism. The terrorist allocates its resources over T 
periods according to a geometric series with a stockpiling parameter. 
This article analyzes how the government and terrorist prefer low versus 
high stockpiling parameters and how these preferences interact with the 
other parameters such as the terrorist’s resources and the players’ asset 
valuations, unit defense and attack costs, and discount factors. If the 
terrorist’s resources are small, it can be deterred in each period. If the 
terrorist’s resources are extremely large, it allocates its resources equally 
across the T periods, whereas the government prefers a single attack. If 
the terrorist’s resources are intermediate, the terrorist would be deterred 
in each period if it allocated its resources equally across the T periods. It 
thus strikes a balance where it allocates much resources to early or late 
periods, to facilitate attacks, and accept being deterred in the other 
periods. As the future becomes less important, the terrorist attacks more 
in early periods.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding and defeating terrorist threats over time is important but 
challenging. This article assumes that a terrorist has resources that it 
allocates over T time periods. It may choose a single attack, attack 
substantially in early periods, or stockpile for later attacks. In each time 
period the government defends an asset and attacks the terrorist’s 
resources to degrade its attack capability. The terrorist defends its 
resources and attacks the government’s asset.
The objective of the article is to understand a multiplicity of 
phenomena, such as how the government allocates between defending 
its asset and attacking the terrorist’s resources, how the terrorist allocates 
across defense and attack and through time, how the government can 
deter the terrorist from attacking, how the terrorist can pacify the 
government, and when an interior-solution equilibrium exists where both 
players defend and attack. Assuming geometric resource stockpiling for 
the terrorist, the results depend on the terrorist’s resources and the players’ 
asset valuations, unit defense and attack costs, and discount factors.
The government is assumed to possess an asset that it defends. We 
assume that the terrorist takes the government’s defense of this asset as 
given when choosing its attack strategy in each time period. Hence, in each 
period, we analyze a two-stage game where the government moves in the 
first stage and the terrorist moves in the second stage.
In earlier research, Azaiez and Bier (2007) considered the optimal 
resource allocation for security in reliability systems. Bier et al. (2005) and 
Bier and Abhichandani (2002) assumed that the defender minimizes the 
success probability and expected damage of an attack. Bier et al. (2005) 
analyzed the protection of series and parallel systems with components of 
different values. Levitin (2007) considered the optimal element separation 
and protection in complex multistate series-parallel systems and suggested 
an algorithm for determining the expected damage caused by a strategic 
attacker. Patterson and Apostolakis (2007) introduced importance measures 
for ranking the system elements in complex systems exposed to terrorist 
actions. Michaud and Apostolakis (2006) analyzed such measures of 
damage caused by the terror as impact on people, impact on environment, 
impact on public image, etc.
Bier et al. (2007) assumed that a defender allocates defense to a collec-
tion of locations, whereas an attacker chooses a location to attack. They 
showed that the defender allocates resources in a centralized, rather than 
decentralized, manner and that the optimal allocation of resources can be 
nonmonotonic in the value of the attacker’s outside option. Furthermore, 
the defender prefers its defense to be public rather than secret. Also, the 
defender sometimes leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers
a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could 
be achieved at zero cost. Dighe et al. (2009) considered secrecy in 
defensive allocations as a strategy for achieving more cost-effective 
attacker deterrence. Zhuang and Bier (2011) modeled secrecy and 
deception as a signaling and resource allocation game between a 
government and a terrorist.
Hausken et al. (2009) considered a defender that chooses tradeoffs be-
tween investments in protection against natural disaster only, protection 
against terrorism only, and all-hazards protection, allowing sequential or 
simultaneous moves. Similarly, Zhuang and Bier (2007) studied the bal-
ance between natural disaster and terrorism, where either the defender 
moves first (and the attacker second) or they move simultaneously. Pinker 
(2007) studied the tradeoff between physical deployments of security per-
sonnel and private/public warnings in the face of a strategic attack with 
uncertainty in the timing and location of attacks. Levitin and Hausken 
(2008) considered a two-period model where the defender, moving first, 
distributes its resources between deploying redundant elements and pro-
tecting them from attacks. Recently, Bakshi and Gans (2010) studied a 
game between government, trading firms, and terrorists in a supply chain, 
where the government provides incentives to firms to improve security 
upstream in the supply chain.
For a survey of work that examines the strategic dynamics of 
governments vs. terrorists, see Sandler and Siqueira (2009). They 
surveyed advances in game-theoretic analyses of terrorism, such as 
proactive versus defensive countermeasures, the impact of domestic 
politics, the interaction between political and militant factions within 
terror-ist groups, and fixed budgets. Further, Brown et al. (2006) 
considered defender–attacker–defender models. First, the defender invests 
in protect-ing the infrastructure, subject to a budget constraint. Then, a 
resource-constrained attack is carried out. Finally, the defender operates the 
residual system as best possible. Brown et al. (2006) used border 
control, the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, and electric power grids as 
examples. Trajtenberg (2006) studied a model with a nonstrategic terrorist, 
targets in a given country that choose defensive measures, and a 
government who chooses the proactive effort level.
Some research has focused on investment substitutions across time. 
First, Enders and Sandler (2004) suggested that a terrorist may compile and 
accumulate resources during times when the government’s investments are 
high, awaiting times when the government may relax its efforts and choose 
lower investments. Second, Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003) showed that 
“the optimal control of terror stocks will rely on both ongoing abatement 
and periodic cleanup” (p. 201) of “a terrorist’s ‘stock of terror 
capacity’“ (p. 224). Enders and Sandler (2005) used time series to show that 
little has
changed in overall terrorism incidents before and after 9/11. Using 9/11 as a 
break date, they found that logistically complex hostage-taking events have 
fallen as a proportion of all events, whereas logistically simple, but deadly, 
bombings have increased as a proportion of deadly incidents. Enders and 
Sandler (1993) applied data from 1968 to 1988 and found both substitutes 
and complements among the attack modes. Evaluating the effectiveness of 
six policies designed to thwart terrorism, they found that policies designed 
to reduce one type of attack may affect other attack modes.
Sandler and Siqueira (2006) modeled the differences between proactive 
and defensive policies with pseudo contest functions. They found that pre-
emption is usually undersupplied. A country’s deterrence decision involves 
both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected, whereas 
its preemption decision typically provides external benefits when the threat 
is reduced for all potential targets. With damages limited to home interests, 
they found that a country will overdeter, whereas for globalized terror, a 
country will underdeter. Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) considered, 
in a two-stage game, the interaction between preemption and defense. In 
the first stage, two countries decide their levels of preemption against a 
common threat. Preemption decreases damages at a diminishing rate. 
Preemption, as a public good, is subject to a free-rider problem. In the 
second stage, the countries decide their levels of defense against the 
threat ad-justed by the first-stage preemption. An increase in one country’s 
defense increases the probability of an attack against the other country. They 
found that high-cost defenders may rely on preemption, and too little 
preemption may give rise to subsequent excessive defense.
C´arceles-Poveda and Tauman (2011) studied a two-stage game. In the 
first stage, an endogenously determined subset of countries choose their 
proactive effort levels, which downgrade through a functional form the 
resources available to the terrorist in the second stage. In the second stage, 
the terrorist allocates its remaining resources to attack the countries while, at 
the same time, the countries choose their defensive measures.
There are significant differences between Bandyopadhyay and Sandler’s 
(2011) paper and C´arceles-Poveda and Tauman’s (2011) paper and the 
present article. First, we assume that both the government and the terror-
ist are fully strategic when allocating their resources between defense and 
attack. The terrorist’s resources are downgraded by two fully strategic players 
where the government attacks and the terrorist defends its resources. In 
contrast, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) assumed a nonstrategic 
threat and C´arceles-Poveda and Tauman (2011) assumed that the resources 
available to the terrorist in the second stage are downgraded nonstrategi-
cally through a functional exponential form. The resources available to the 
terrorist in the second stage are applied in their entirety. The terrorist’s 
strategic decision is how to allocate its downgraded resources across the
countries. Second, we assume that the damage probability for the 
government’s asset depends on the strategic decision by the government of 
how well to defend its asset and the strategic decision by the terrorist of 
how well to attack the asset using its downgraded resources, accounting 
for a contest intensity. In contrast, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) 
assumed that the terrorist’s second-stage attack depends nonstrategically 
and func-tionally on the countries’ first-stage preemption, and C´arceles-
Poveda and Tauman (2011) assumed that the damage inflicted on country 
i is deter-mined by a functional form that is proportional to the resources 
allocated by the terrorist to country i, proportional to the political and/or 
economic power of country i, and inverse proportional to the defense of 
country i in the second stage. Third, we consider one unitary government, 
which means abstracting away the collective action problem of multiple 
governments. In contrast, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) and  
C´arceles-Poveda and Tauman (2011) accounted for the collective action 
problem with two and multiple players, respectively. Fourth, both 
Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2011) and this article determine solutions in 
which the government does not defend. Zhuang et al. (2010) modeled 
secrecy and deception as a mul-tiperiod signaling and resource allocation 
and considered both long-run and short-run defenses.
Raczynski (2004) simulated the dynamic interactions between terror and 
antiterror groups. Feichtinger and Novak (2008) used differential game 
theory to study the intertemporal strategic interactions of Western 
governments and terror organizations. They also illustrated long-run 
persistent oscillations. Berman and Gavious (2007) studied a leader–
follower game in which the state provides counterterrorism support across 
multiple metropolitan areas to minimize losses, and the terrorist attacks 
one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility. Berrebi and 
Lakdawalla (2007) considered for 1949–2004 how terrorists sought targets 
in Israel, respond-ing to costs and benefits, and found that long periods 
without an attack signaled lower risk for most localities but higher risk for 
important areas. Barros et al. (2006) applied parametric and 
semiparametric hazard model specifications to study durations between 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA, a Spain-based terrorist group) terrorist 
attacks, which seem to increase in the summer and decrease with respect to, 
for example, deterrence and political variables. Udwadia et al. (2006) 
considered the dynamic behavior of terrorists, those susceptible to terrorist 
and pacifist propaganda, military/police intervention to reduce the terrorist 
population, and nonviolent, persuasive intervention to influence those 
susceptible to becoming pacifists. Hausken (2008) considered a terrorist 
that defends an asset that grows from the first to the second period. The 
terrorist seeks to eliminate the asset optimally across the two periods. 
Telesca and Lovallo (2006) found that a terror event is not independent from 
the time elapsed since the previous event, except
for severe attacks, which approach a Poisson process. This latter finding 
suggests that attack and defense decisions are not unit-periodic in nature 
but that there are linkages through time. One objective of the current article 
is to understand more thoroughly the nature of such linkages through time, 
affected by changes in resources, unit costs of defense and attack, etc.
Our article builds upon and extends earlier research mentioned above. 
On the one hand, we enrich the one-period model by allowing both the gov-
ernment and terrorist to both defend and attack. The government defends 
itself and at the same time attacks the terrorist’s resources. Analogously, 
the terrorist defends its resources and at the same time uses its surviving 
resources to attack the government. On the other hand, we repeat the one-
period model T times to understand how long the terrorist can be deterred. 
A resourceful terrorist is obviously harder to deter than a less resourceful 
terrorist, but it is not obvious how a government should allocate its 
resources to defending itself and attacking the terrorist and, analogously, 
how the terrorist should allocate its resources to defend itself and attack 
the government. This article seeks to determine the key factors that impact 
such resource allocation problems, which are important for governments, 
policy makers, and even terrorists to understand.
In an earlier paper, Hausken and Zhuang (2011b) assumed fixed 
government resources so that the government has only one free decision 
variable. Similarly, Hausken and Zhuang (2011a) assumed that the 
government only defends and does not have the option to attack the 
terrorist’s resources. Fur-thermore, Hausken and Zhuang (2011a) only 
studied a two-period game. By contrast, this article allows both attacks 
and defenses for both government and the terrorist in a T-period game, 
and the defender’s two decision variables are free because there is no 
fixed resource. Such ex-tensions provide more general insights and 
modeling framework to the attacker–defender game literature.
The following section presents the model. The next section solves the 
two-stage game, illustrated in the subsequent section. Then we analyze and 
illustrate the T-period game, and the final secction concludes the article.
THE MODEL 
Notation
At Terrorist’s attack effort attacking the asset in period t
at Government’s attack effort attacking the terrorist’s resources Rt
in period t
Bt Terrorist’s unit attack cost in period t
bt Government’s unit defense cost in period t
Dt Terrorist’s defense effort protecting its resources in period t
dt Government’s defense effort protecting the asset in period t
Pt Probability of asset destruction in period t
R Terrorist’s total resources in the T-period game
Rt Terrorist’s resources in period t
rt Government’s resources in period t
T Number of time periods
t Time period, t = 1, . . . , T
U Terrorist’s accumulative discounted utility
Ut Terrorist’s expected utility in period t
u Government’s accumulative discounted utility
ut Government’s expected utility in period t
Vt Terrorist’s asset valuation
vt Government’s asset valuation
W Terrorist’s stockpiling parameter
 Terrorist’s discount factor
δ Government’s discount factor
Assumptions
We assume that the terrorist has resources Rt that are transformed at unit 
cost Bt ≥ 0 into attack At of an asset1 controlled by the government and 
transformed at unit cost 1 into defense Dt against the government’s attack. 
The unit cost 1 is a benchmark against which Bt is compared. The 
government attacks the terrorist’s resources with at at unit cost 1. We 
model the probability of survival of the terrorist’s resources with the 
common ratio form (Skaperdas 1996; Tullock 1980) contest success 
function; that is,
Qt (at ,Dt ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if at = Dt = 0
Dt
Dt + at otherwise
(1)
where ∂Qt/∂Dt ≥ 0 and ∂Qt/∂at ≤ 0. When at = 0, the government
does not attack, so there is no need for the terrorist to defend, which gives
Dt = 0. We define this event such that the terrorist invests an arbitrarily
small but positive amount Dt that allows it to retain its entire resources so
1For analytical tractability one asset is considered. The model also applies for collections
of assets interpreted as a joint asset. One example of a collection of assets is the four targets
of the 9/11 attack; that is, the World Trade Center’s North and South Towers, the Pentagon,
and the White House (which was not hit). Focusing on one asset means that we do not analyze
how the government and terrorist substitute resources across assets. See Enders and Sandler
(2004), Hausken (2006), Bier et al. (2007, 2008), and Hao et al. (2009) for when a government
allocates defense to a collection of locations and a terrorist chooses a location to attack.
that Qt = 1. The terrorist’s original resources in each period is Rt, but it
decreases to QtRt due to the government’s attack. The terrorist’s resource
allocation equation can thus be expressed as:
Qt (at ,Dt )Rt = BtAt + Dt (2)
Equation (2) means that the terrorist strikes a balance between attacking the
asset and defending its resources. The government defends its asset with
dt ≥ 0 at unit cost bt ≥ 0. The government unit attack cost 1 is a benchmark
against which bt is compared. For the probability of asset destruction in
period t, we consider the following form of the contest success function:
Pt (dt , At ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if At = dt = 0
At
At + dt
otherwise (3)
where ∂Pt/∂dt ≤ 0 and ∂Pt/∂At ≥ 0. When At = 0, the terrorist does
not attack, so there is no need for the government to defend, which gives
dt = 0. We define this event such that the government invests an arbitrarily
small but positive amount dt that allows it to retain its entire asset so that
the probability of asset destruction equals zero.
The probability that the asset is not destroyed is 1 − Pt (dt , At ), which the
government maximizes, accounting for the asset valuation vt, asset defense
expenditures btdt , and resource attack expenditures at . Conversely, the
terrorist maximizes the probability Pt (dt , At ) of asset destruction, striking
a balance between defending its resources Rt and attacking the asset valued
at Vt. The government’s and terrorist’s expected utilities in period t are
ut (dt , at , At ) = [1 − Pt (dt , At )]vt − btdt − at
Ut (dt , at , At ) = Pt (dt , At )Vt (4)
This means that the government’s resources are a variable determined by
rt = btdt + at , which is realistic because the government has the capac-
ity needed to compile the resources needed for optimizing behavior; for
example, transfer funds from other government branches. The terrorist’s
resources compilation mechanism is different. Its focus is narrower, it can-
not easily transfer funds from other branches, and it cannot easily take
up loans. Its resources are determined by incoming funds, which can be
one-shot or increase or decrease over time. We thus assume that the terror-
ist’s resources are fixed to Rt in period t, which allows us to analyze how
the terrorist stockpiles resources over time. Inserting (2) and (3) into (4)
 gives:
ut (dt , at ,Dt , At )
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vt − btdt − at if At = 0
dt
Rt/Bt + dt vt − btdt if At > 0, at = 0
dt([
Dt
Dt+at Rt − Dt
]/
Bt
)
+ dt
vt − btdt − at otherwise
Ut (dt , at ,Dt , At ) (5)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if At = 0
Rt/Bt
Rt/Bt + dt Vt if At > 0, at = 0([
Dt
Dt+at Rt − Dt
]/
Bt
)
([
Dt
Dt+at Rt − Dt
]/
Bt
)
+ dt
Vt otherwise
The government’s two free-choice variables are dt and at. The terrorist’s
one free-choice variable is Dt, where At follows from (2). We assume
common knowledge so that both players know all parameters and the
game structure.
Problem Formulation
To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we assume that the
government chooses dt and at simultaneously in the first stage. The terrorist
observes dt and at and chooses At in the second stage. The game is solved
with backward induction.
Definition 1. A strategy pair (at , dt ,Dt ) is a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium if and only if
Dt = Dt (at , dt ) = arg maxDt≥0 Ut (at , dt ,Dt ) (6)
and
(at , dt ) = arg maxat≥0,dt≥0 ut (at , dt ,Dt (at , dt )) (7)
SOLVING THE TWO-STAGE GAME
We solve the game with backward induction, starting with the second stage.
The terrorist’s first-order condition in the second stage implies:
∂Ut (dt , at ,Dt , At )
∂Dt
= 0 ⇒ Dt =
{√
Rtat − at iff at < Rt
0 iff at ≥ Rt (8)
Although we allow the terrorist to choose Dt ∈ [0, Rt], (8) implies that
when the government attacks too severely in the first stage, at ≥ Rt, the
terrorist chooses Dt = 0, which implies At = 0 according to (2).
Inserting (8) into (5) to yield the government’s first stage utility:
ut (dt , at ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
dtvt([√Rt − √at ]2/Bt)+ dt − btdt − at iff at < Rt
vt − btdt − at iff at ≥ Rt
(9)
There are five possible optimal solutions, referred to as cases 1–5:
Case 1: at ≥ Rt . Then the terrorist is fully deterred with optimal vari-
ables at = Rt , dt = 0, and government utility ut (dt , at ) = vt − Rt ≡
ut1, which is nonnegative when vt ≥ Rt .
Case 2: 0 < at < Rt , dt > 0. Then we can solve the two first-order
conditions simultaneously:
∂ut (dt , at )
∂dt
= ([
√
Rt − √at ]2/Bt )vt
([√Rt − √at ]2/Bt + dt )2
− bt = 0
∂ut (dt , at )
∂at
= dt ([
√
Rt − √at ]/Bt )vt√
at ([
√
Rt − √at ]2/Bt + dt )2
− 1 = 0
(10)
and obtain
√
at = (vt − bt
√
Rt )
Bt − bt => at =
(vt − bt
√
Rt )2
(Bt − bt )2 ,
dt = (vt − bt
√
Rt )(
√
RtBt − vt )
bt (Bt − bt )2 (11)
This is possible if and only if:
0 < at = (vt − bt
√
Rt )2
(Bt − bt )2 < Rt, dt =
(vt − bt
√
Rt )(
√
RtBt − vt )
bt (Bt − bt )2 > 0,
(12)
which implies:
0 <
(vt − bt
√
Rt )2
(Bt − bt )2 < Rt,
(
vt
Bt
)2
< Rt <
(
vt
bt
)2
(13)
and the government’s utility is
ut (dt , at ) =
(
vt
bt
− √Rt
)(Bt − √Rt )
bt (Bt − bt ) ≡ ut2 (14)
Case 3: at = 0, dt > 0. Then we solve the first-order condition:
∂ut (dt , at )
∂dt
= ([
√
Rt − √at ]2/Bt )vt
([√Rt − √at ]2/Bt + dt )2
− bt = 0, (15)
which gives
at = 0, dt =
√
Rtvt
Btbt
− Rt
Bt
, (16)
which is possible if and only if:
dt =
√
Rtvt
Btbt
− Rt
Bt
> 0 ⇔ Rt < Btvt
bt
, (17)
which gives the utility:
ut (dt , at ) =
(√
Rtvt
Bt bt
− Rt
Bt
)
vt
Rt
Bt
+
√
Rtvt
Bt bt
− Rt
Bt
− bt
(√
Rtvt
Btbt
− Rt
Bt
)
=
(√
vt −
√
btRt
Bt
)2
≡ ut3 (18)
where (17) ensures that the expression being squared is nonnegative.
Case 4: at = 0, dt = 0, which gives ut (dt , at ) = 0 ≡ ut4.
Case 5: 0 < at < Rt , dt = 0. Then we solve the first-order condition:
∂ut (dt , at )
∂at
= dt ([
√
Rt − √at ]/Bt )vt√
at ([
√
Rt − √at ]2/Bt + dt )2
− 1 = −1 = 0, (19)
which is impossible.
In summary, and after some calculations, the four possible cases are sum-
marized in Table 1.
Comparing ut1 and ut3 when these are nonnegative gives:
ut1 ≥ ut3 ⇔ vt − Rt ≥
(√
vt −
√
btRt
Bt
)2
⇔ Rt ≤ vt 4bt/Bt(1 + bt/Bt )2
(20)
Property 1. When Bt/bt ≤ 1, the government prefers to attack the terrorist’s
resources (at = Rt and dt = 0), rather than passively defending its asset
(at = 0 and dt > 0).
Proof. The rightmost inequality in (20) must be less than vt, because
vt
4bt /Bt
(1+bt /Bt )2 ≤ vt ⇔ 0 ≤ (1 − bt/Bt )2, which is always satisfied. Hence,
ut1 always weakly dominates ut3 when Bt/bt ≤ 1, which follows from
vt ≥ Rt and (17).
Therefore, when Bt/bt ≤ 1, we only need to compare ut1, ut2, and
ut4 (Appendix A). When Bt/bt > 1 we get three cases. First, when
vt < Rtbt/Bt , neither cases 1 nor 3 apply, and we only need to com-
pare ut2 and ut4 (Appendix B). Second, when Rtbt/Bt ≤ vt < Rt , case 3
applies, and case 1 does not apply, so we only need to compare ut2, ut3,
and ut4 (Appendix C). Third, when vt ≥ Rt , both cases 1 and 3 apply.
Equation (20) can be rewritten as ut1 ≥ ut3 ⇔ Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt ≤ vt . Hence,
when vt ≥ Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt ≥ Rt , we only need to compare ut1, ut2, and ut4
(Appendix A). When vt ≤ Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt , we only need to compare ut2, ut3,
and ut4 (Appendix C). 
ILLUSTRATING THE TWO-STAGE GAME
We first consider the special cases Bt = bt, which excludes case 2 according
to (13). The government benefits from a terrorist with little resources in
case 1 and suffers from a resourceful terrorist in case 4. The government’s
utility is continuous through vt = Rt, whereas the terrorist’s utility increases
discontinuously when Rt increases above vt and the government abruptly
ceases to deter. Figure 1 plots at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Rt when
Bt = bt = Vt = vt = 1. When the government is superior, expressed with
vt ≥ Rt, the government deters the terrorist (case 1), where at increases and
ut decreases in Rt. Case 3 is excluded because the government prefers to
deter the terrorist rather than jointly protect and attack. When the terrorist is
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Figure 1. at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Rt when Bt = bt = Vt =
vt = 1.
superior, expressed as vt ≤ Rt, the government neither defends nor attacks
(case 4).
The direct transition from cases 1 to 4, in the sense of no intermediate
steps through cases 2 and/or 3, also occurs when Bt < bt. A strong terrorist
(with low unit attack cost) tends to induce an all-or-nothing governmental
response. Either the government deters the terrorist or it gives up. The tran-
sition between cases 1 and 4 is smooth in the sense that the government’s
utility decreases gradually to zero as the terrorist’s resources increase to
the transition point between cases 1 and 4.
A weakened terrorist, with a higher unit attack cost than Bt = 1, al-
lows cases 2 and 3 to occur, which are not all-or-nothing governmental
responses. Figure 2 plots at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Rt when
bt = 1 and Bt = 2. All panels give case 1, which deters the terrorist when
Rt is low, and case 4, where the government gives up, when Rt is large.
Because the terrorist is disadvantaged with the large Bt = 2, there is no
direct transition from cases 1 to 4. Instead, there is transition through case
3 only when Vt = vt is very small or very large (Figures 2a, 2b, 2f–2i),
through cases 2 and 3 when Vt = vt is small or large (Figures 2c and 2e),
and through case 2 only when Vt = vt is intermediate (Vt = vt = 2). The
extreme value Vt = vt allows case 3 where the government defends only
and the terrorist attacks only. The intermediate value Vt = vt = 2 is needed
to allow case 2 where both players prefer, and accept, that both players
both defend and attack.
SENSITIVITY ANALSYSIS ON Bt AND bt
This section studies the sensitivity when the terrorist’s unit attack cost 
Bt and/or the government’s unit defense cost bt vary. Such changes may
Figure 2. at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Rt when bt = 1 and Bt = 2.
occur for a variety of reasons. One reason is that the terrorist and the
government learn as time progresses. Learning may cause Bt and bt to
decrease over time. They become better suited to choose the right tasks to
execute, carry out these tasks more efficiently, and utilize their equipment
more proficiently. Bt and bt may also increase over time; for example, due
to fatigue or equipment being subject to wear and tear, requiring more
frequent maintenance.
Sensitivity of the Terrorist’s Unit Attack Cost Bt
Figure 3 plots at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Bt when bt = 1 for
various Rt and Vt = vt.
Figure 3a (Rt = 0.5, Vt = vt = 1) shows case 1 to the government’s
advantage when Bt < 5.83 and case 3 when Bt > 5.83. A large attacker unit
Figure 3. at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of Bt when bt = 1 for various
Rt and Vt = vt.
attack cost when the terrorist has little resources causes the government
to allow the terrorist to attack because protection can easily and cost-
efficiently be furnished against the modest attack. Increasing Rt causes the
range for case 1 to shrink. Figure 3b (Rt = 0.9999, Vt = vt = 1) shows case
1 when Bt < 1.02. Increasing Rt to Rt = 1 causes case 1 to be replaced
with case 4 in accordance with Figure 1 when Bt = 1. Increasing Rt above
1 causes case 4 to expand to the terrorist’s advantage. Figure 3c (Rt = 2,
Vt = vt = 1) shows case 4 when Bt < 2 and case 3 when Bt > 2.
The absence of case 2 in Figures 3a–3c is in accordance with Figure 2b
where Vt = vt = 1. To introduce case 2, Figures 3d–3f assume Vt = vt =
2 as in Figure 2d. Figure 3d (Rt = 0.5, Vt = vt = 2) shows case 1 to the
government’s advantage when Bt < 13.93 and case 3 when Bt > 13.93.
Increasing Rt again causes the range for case 1 to shrink. Figure 3e (Rt =
0.9999, Vt = vt = 2) shows case 1 when Bt < 5.83.
Increasing Rt above 1 causes the emergence of case 2. Figure 3f (Rt =
1.02, Vt = vt = 2) shows case 2 when 1.99 < Bt < 5.78 where the terrorist
enjoys a substantial utility increase compared with Rt = 0.9999 because
the government no longer deters the terrorist. The government nevertheless
enjoys a utility close to 1.
Increasing Rt above 1.9 causes alternation of cases 2 and 3, and increas-
ing Rt above 2 causes case 1 to be replaced with case 4 in accordance with
Figure 1 when Bt = 1. Figure 3g (Rt = Vt = vt = 2) shows case 4 when
Bt < 1, case 3 when 1 < Bt < 1.54 or Bt > 4.05, and case 2 when 1.54 <
Bt < 4.05.
Increasing Rt further above 2 causes case 4 to expand upwards and the
upper case 3 to expand downwards. Figure 3h (Rt = 3, Vt = vt = 2) shows
case 4 when Bt < 1.5, case 3 when 1.5 < Bt < 1.77 or Bt > 2.99, and case
2 when 1.77 < Bt < 2.99.
Increasing Rt above 4 causes the disappearance of case 2. (We have
case 2 in a small range when Rt = 3.99, which is not shown.) Figure 3i
(Rt = 4, Vt = vt = 2) shows case 4 when Bt < 2 and case 3 when Bt >
2. A low attacker unit attack cost when the terrorist has many resources
causes the government to give up. As Bt increases, the government starts
to defend itself. Decreased Bt—for example, as a consequence of terrorist
learning—enables the terrorist to enjoy a switch from case 3 to case 4.
Sensitivity of the Government’s Unit Defense Cost bt
Figure 4 plots at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of bt when Bt = 1 for
various Rt and Vt = vt. Figure 4a (Rt = 0.5, Vt = vt = 1) shows case 1 when
Figure 4. at, dt, At, Dt, ut, and Ut as functions of bt when Bt = 1 for various
Rt and Vt = vt.
bt > 0.17 and case 3 when bt < 0.17. Observe the left–right reversal of
cases 1 and 3 compared with Figure 3a. Regardless of how large bt is, the
government can deter the terrorist by attacking and, thus, enjoy case 1. As
bt decreases below 0.17, the government can exploit the low unit defense
cost to defend, enjoying a larger utility than by pure deterrence and, thus,
allow the terrorist to attack. Figure 4b (Rt = 4, Vt = vt = 2) shows case 3
when bt < 0.5 and case 4 when bt > 0.5. Observe the left–right reversal of
cases 3 and 4 compared with Figure 3i. A resourceful terrorist and a high
governmental unit defense cost cause the government to neither defend nor
attack. Decreased bt, which may occur, for example, as a consequence of
government learning, enables the government to enjoy a switch from case
4 to case 3.
Sensitivity of Bt = bt
When bt = Bt, the parameter values Rt = 0.5 and Vt = vt = 1 cause case
1 (At = Dt = Ut = dt = 0, at = ut = 0.5), and Rt = 4 and Vt = vt = 2
cause case 4 (Dt = at = dt = ut = 0, At = 4/Bt, Ut = 2). The equal unit
defense costs cause a situation of either case 1 where the terrorist is de-
terred or case 4 where the government gives up. Equal unit defense costs
fluctuating, for example, downwards may arise; for example, when the
government and terrorist learn at the same rate.
THE T PERIOD GAME
Theoretical Development
The two-stage game is played T times, referred to as periods, where T can
be arbitrarily large. We assume that the time between periods is sufficiently
longer than the time between stages so that each two-stage game can be
solved with backward induction for each period. This means that the players
are myopic and boundedly rational in the sense that they only consider one
two-stage game in each period. The terrorist allocates resources R over T
time periods, facing a complex decision-making procedure through time.
Making Rt a free-choice variable to be optimized in each time period is
quite a challenge both for the terrorist and the researcher. We thus simplify
the decision-making procedure by assuming that the terrorist allocates R1
to the first period and changes its allocation according to the geometric
progression:
Rt = WRt−1, for 1 < t ≤ T , (21)
 such that
R =
T∑
t=1
Rt = R1 W
T − 1
W − 1 . (22)
This simplification enables the terrorist to focus on the one parameter
W, which is determined before the first period. This makes the problem
tractable and allows for sufficiently different attack scenarios as W changes
from zero to infinity. The parameter W determines the strategy of resource
allocation through the T periods: W > 1 corresponds to increasing the
resource allocation. W = ∞ corresponds to allocating the entire resources
in the last time period RT = R, which is also analyzed as the two-stage
game, for the last period. W < 1 corresponds to decreasing the resource
allocation. W = 1 corresponds to even resource distribution across the K
attacks. Then the analysis in each time period is equivalent to the analysis
of the two-stage game, replacing R with R/T . Finally, W = 0 corresponds
to allocating the entire resources in the first time period R1 = R, which is
also analyzed as the two-stage game, for the first period. We thus get:
R1 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R
W − 1
WT − 1 when W 
= 1
R
T
when W = 1
, Rt = Wt−1R1. (23)
The government uses intelligence and spies to compile complete informa-
tion about Rt allocated to each attack. Hence, all parameters are common
knowledge. The contest in each time period is such that the government
may either keep its asset, lose its asset, keep a fraction of its asset, or keep
its asset with a specified probability. In each subsequent time period, the
contest starts anew over an asset with a specified value; that is, valued as
vt by the government and valued as Vt by the terrorist.
We define the players’ accumulative discounted utilities over the T time
periods as:
u =
⎧⎨
⎩
T∑
t=1
δt−1ut when 0 < δ ≤ 1
u1 when δ = 0
,
U =
⎧⎨
⎩
T∑
t=1
t−1Ut when 0 <  ≤ 1
U1 when  = 0
(24)
where δ and  are time discount factors. If the government’s asset is
destroyed or partly destroyed in one period, it is refurnished from an outside
source prior to the subsequent period. The terrorist chooses W before the
first period, has a time horizon of T periods, and uses (24) to determine
its accumulative discounted utility over the T periods. Analogously, the
government uses (24) to determine its accumulative discounted utility over
the T periods.
Illustrative examples
Figure 5 plots the equilibrium dynamics as a function of time period t for
various W and R when Rt follows the geometric progression, assuming δ =
 = bt = Bt = Vt = vt = 1 and T = 10. With these parameter values, Figure
2b implies that only cases 1 and 3 are possible. When W = 1, the terrorist’s
resources are spread equally through the T = 10 periods, which gives Rt =
5/10 = 0.5 in Figure 5b and Rt = 15/10 = 1.5 in Figure 5e. This means
that the terrorist receives incoming resources Rt in equal amounts in each
time period and decides to allocate this entire portion Rt in each period,
without planning for the future or somehow assessing whether W 
= 1 may
be appropriate.
Figure 5. Equilibrium dynamics as a function of t for various W and R,
bt = Bt = Vt = vt = 1, T = 10.
Figure 5b gives case 1 and is the only panel among the six panels where
the government successfully deters the terrorist throughout the 10 periods.
For each period t = 1, . . . , 10, we have at = Rt = ut = 0.5 and dt = At =
Dt = Ut = 0. The accumulative utilities are u = 10 × 0.5 = 5 and U = 0.
Figure 5e gives case 4 and is the only panel among the six panels where the
government neither defends nor attacks throughout the 10 periods, while
the terrorist attacks throughout the 10 periods. For each period t = 1, . . . ,
10, we have Rt = At = 1.5, Ut = 1, and at = dt = Dt = ut = 0. The
accumulative utilities are u = 0 and U = 10 × 1 = 10.
When W = 0.5, Rt decreases geometrically through the 10 periods. In
Figure 5a, case 4 arises when t ≤ 2, transitioning to case 1 when t > 2,
with accumulative utilities u = 6.75 and U = 2.00. Therefore, both players
prefer W = 0.5 rather than W = 1. In Figure 5d, where the terrorist is more
resourceful, the transition from cases 3 to 1 occurs when t = 3, with u =
5.14 and U = 3.00 because the attacker is more resourceful. Intuitively,
the higher R is, the longer the terrorist enjoys case 4 before switching to
case 1. Thus, when R = 15 the government prefers W = 0.5 rather than
W = 1, whereas the terrorist prefers the reverse.
Analogously, in Figures 5c and 5f where W = 2, Rt increases geometri-
cally with transitioning from cases 1 to 3 in periods 9 and 8, respectively.
The higher R is, the sooner the terrorist enjoys the switch from cases 1 to
3. When the Ws are chosen such that W = 0.5 is the inverse of W = 2,
the utilities of Figure 5a always equal the utilities of Figure 5c, where Fig-
ure 5c is the time-reversed version of Figure 5a. Analogously, the utilities
of Figure 5d always equal the utilities of Figure 5f. The terrorist prefers
Figure 5d and 5f over Figure 5a and 5c because it has more resources,
whereas the government prefers Figures 5a and 5c over Figures 5d and 5f
by contrast.
Figure 6 plots the equilibrium dynamics as a function of time period t
for various W and R when Rt follows the geometric progression, assuming
bt = 1, Vt = vt = Bt = 2, and T = 10, which should be compared with
Figure 2d. When W = 1 in Figure 6, Figure 6b is the only panel where
case 1 occurs throughout the 10 periods (u = 15, U = 0), and Figure 6e is
the only panel where case 2 occurs throughout the 10 periods (u = 6.01,
U = 4.49). When W = 0.5 and R = 5 (Figure 6a), case 2 occurs when
t ≤ 2, case 1 occurs when t > 2, and case 4 does not arise (because the
attacker is not sufficiently advantaged when t = 0 and R is as low as 5),
with u = 15.71 and U = 1.40. When W = 0.5 and R = 15 (Figure 6d),
case 4 occurs when t ≤ 1, case 2 occurs when 1 < t ≤ 3, and case 1 occurs
when t > 3, with u = 12.54 and U = 4.61. Therefore, both players prefer
W = 0.5 rather than W = 1 when R = 5 or R = 15. Again, Figures 6c and
6f are the time-reversed versions to Figures 6a and 6d, respectively. The
Figure 6. Equilibrium dynamics as a function of t for various W and R,
bt = 1, Vt = vt = Bt = 2, T = 10.
terrorist prefers Figures 6d and 6f over Figures 6a and 6c because it has
more resources, whereas the government prefers Figures 6a and 6c over
Figures 6d and 6f by contrast.
According to (24), the government’s accumulative utility u increases in
δ, the terrorist’s accumulative utility U increases in , and, of course, U
increases in R.
Figure 7 plots the accumulative utilities u and U as functions of W when
bt = Bt = Vt = vt = 1, T = 10, for various R and δ = . When δ = 1 the
government’s highest preference is that case 1 arises in each period, which
is possible when R < 1, as seen in Figure 1, and then W is irrelevant. The
government’s second highest preference is that case 4 arises once and that
case 1 arises in the remaining T − 1 periods. That is possible when 1 <
R, and then the government prefers the single attack W = 0 or W = ∞.
In contrast, as R increases above 1, the terrorist prefers to spread its attack
over several periods and earns Ut = Vt in each period of its attacks. For
example, in the upper right panel in Figure 7 where R = 5 and δ =  =
1, the terrorist earns its maximum U = 2 from attacking in periods 1 and
Figure 7. The accumulative utilities u and U as functions of W for various
R and δ =  when bt = Bt = Vt = vt = 1, T = 10.
2 when 0.28 < W < 0.75 and in periods 9 and 10 when 1.34 < W < 3.62
(two ranges exist because of the time-reversed logic when δ =  = 1) and
is deterred in all 10 periods when 0.83 < W < 1.20.2 When R = 5, the
terrorist prefers W to be intermediately small (or intermediately large) to
be able to attack in two periods. When W is too low (or too high), a large
attack occurs in only one period. When W is too close to 1, the terrorist
spreads its resources too equally across all periods and is deterred in each
period.
As R increases above 10, the terrorist can guarantee its preferred case 4
in each period by choosing 0.92 < W < 1.09. This is illustrated in the
lower right panel in Figure 7 where R = 15 and δ =  = 1 and where the
players have exactly opposite preferences. The government prefers W = 0
or W = ∞ and prefers to avoid W close to 1, whereas the terrorist prefers
0.92 < W < 1.09 and prefers to avoid W = 0 or W = ∞.
As the discount factors decrease below 1, the time-reversed logic for
the utilities no longer applies, and the players strike balances between
their preferences for W and time discounting. These preferences are also
opposite. When δ =  = 0, only the first period matters and hence the
government prefers W = ∞, which gives a single attack in the last period
T = 10, whereas the terrorist prefers W = 0, which gives a single attack
2The terrorist earns U = 1 from attacking only in period 1 whenW < 0.28 and 0.75 < W <
0.83 and attacking only in period 10 when 1.20 < W < 1.34 and W > 3.62.
Figure 8. The accumulative utilities u and U as functions of W for various
R and δ =  when bt = 1, Bt = Vt = vt = 2, T = 10.
in the first period. That is, when the government becomes more myopic, it
prefers that the terrorist stockpile rather than use its resources now. More
generally, the government enjoys case 1 regardless of δ and W when R < 1
and prefers W = ∞ when δ < 1. The terrorist always prefers W ≤ 1 when
 < 1 because the time-reversed logic for the utilities does not apply. The
range for the terrorist’s resources where the terrorist enjoys case 4 are the
same regardless of , but  < 1 causes discounted utility U as illustrated
when δ =  = 0 in Figure 7.
Figure 8 plots u and U as functions of W when bt = 1, Bt = Vt = vt =
2, T = 10, for various R and δ = . The terrorist’s unit attack cost Bt is
twice as high as in Figure 7. As in Figure 7, the government prefers the
single attack W = 0 or W = ∞ when δ = 1 and prefers W = ∞ when
d < 1. As seen in Figure 2d, when choosing W = 1, the terrorist suffers
case 1 in all periods when R/T = Rt < 1, gets case 2 in all periods when
1 < R/T = Rt < 4, and enjoys case 4 in all periods when R/T = Rt > 4.
Hence, the terrorist chooses the single attack W = 0 when inferior with
R = 5 and  = 1 (upper right panel) and chooses W = 0.74 when more
resourceful with R = 15 and  = 1 (lower right panel). W = 0.74 in
Figure 8 (lower right panel) corresponds to the terrorist enjoying case 4 in
period 1, gets case 2 in periods 2–5, and suffers case 1 in periods 6–10.3
One crucial characteristic of Figure 8 is the dependence on case 2. As
Rt decreases through the 10 periods, the terrorist transitions from case 4
through case 2 to case 1. In contrast to Figure 7, the range for the terrorist’s
resources where the terrorist experiences the various cases indeed depends
on the discount factor . For example, when R = 15, the terrorist chooses
W = 0.74 when  = 1 and chooses W = 0.60 when  = 0.5. That is, a
lower discount factor causes the terrorist to attack more thoroughly in the
early periods. The terrorist strikes a balance between stockpiling and time
discounting. It stockpiles less when the future becomes less important.
CONCLUSION
In this article we analyze a model where a government defends against a
terrorist who attacks repeatedly and stockpiles its resources over time. In
each time period the government defends an asset and attacks the terrorist’s
resources. The terrorist defends its resources and uses the surviving portion
of its resources to attack the government.
For a one-period game we demonstrate four possible equilibrium 
solutions: the government attacks only, which deters the terrorist; both 
players defend and attack; the government defends but does not attack 
and the terrorist attacks only; the terrorist attacks only and the 
government neither defends nor attacks. We show how the four cases 
depend on the terrorist’s resources and the players’ asset valuations and 
unit defense and attack costs. Understanding which factors impact the 
four cases is important in order to combat terrorism.
Considering a T-period game, we analyze how the terrorist stockpiles 
resources. To our knowledge, this article is the first t o s tudy resource 
stockpiling in the literature of attacker–defender games. To handle the 
many ways in which the terrorist can stockpile within a time horizon 
of T periods, we assume that before the game starts the terrorist 
determines how much of its resources to use in the first period and its 
geometric stockpiling parameter. A stockpiling parameter equal to 1 
means equal resource allocation in each period; a parameter larger 
(smaller) than 1 means increasing (decreasing) resource allocation; a 
parameter equal to zero means a single attack in the first period; and a 
parameter equal to infinity means a single attack in the last period. 
Both players have time discount parameters that determine their 
accumulative discounted utilities over the T periods.
3This follows because inserting W = 0.74, R = 15, and T = 10 into (21)–(23) implies R1 =
4.10, R2 = 3.04, R3 = 2.25, R4 = 1.66, R5 = 1.23, R6 = 0.91, R7 = 0.67, R8 = 0.50, R9 = 0.37,
R10 = 0.27, and the cases are determined from Figure 2d.
The article analyzes how the government and terrorist prefer low versus 
high stockpiling parameters and how these preferences interact with the 
other parameters such as the terrorist’s resources and the players’ asset 
valuations, unit defense and attack costs, and discount factors. If the 
terrorist’s resources are small, it can be deterred in each period by the 
government’s attack. If the terrorist’s resources are extremely large, it 
allocates its resources equally across the T periods for maximum 
impact, whereas the government prefers a single attack. If the terrorist’s 
resources are intermediate, it would be deterred in each period if it 
allocated its resources equally across the T periods. It thus strikes a 
balance where it allocates many resources to early or late periods to 
facilitate attacks and accepts being deterred in the other periods. As the 
future becomes less important, the terrorist attacks more in early periods.
One shortcoming of this article is that we make explicit assumptions 
about functional forms, such as how the terrorist’s resources are reduced 
by the government’s attack, the probability of asset destruction dependent 
on the players’ defense and attack, and the utilities. By making use of 
credible specific functional forms we produce exact analytical solutions 
for the variables, illustrated with numerical simulations. In return for the 
sacrifice of generality, a successful specification demonstrates internal 
consistency and equilibrium solutions. In addition, we claim that the 
particular functional forms used here are illuminating. (In economics, 
Cobb-Douglas and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
functions, with special assumptions about the functional relations between 
inputs and outputs, have proved useful for understanding production and 
economic growth.) Using particular functional forms makes it possible 
to determine ranges of parameter values within which the four possible 
equilibrium solutions arise.
A second shortcoming is the assumption of complete information, which 
provides a benchmark and is common game theoretically. In reality, 
gathering information is arguably one of the most important and difficult 
tasks facing the government in counterterrorism. Furthermore, it is 
difficult for the terrorist to know how well an asset is protected. Future 
research can allow a variety of terrorist characteristics to be incompletely 
known, such as its resources, unit attack and defense costs, asset 
valuations, and time discount factor. Future research can also consider an 
infinitely repeated game.
A further possible avenue of future research is to merge the model 
in this article, in which the terrorist strikes a balance between 
attacking and protecting its resources, with Morselli et al.’s (2007) 
model, in which the terrorist strikes a balance between secrecy and 
efficiency. That is, the terrorist chooses some value for its efficiency 
parameter. The higher this value is, the more likely the attack will be 
successful but also the more likely the government will be able to thwart 
the attack. The terrorist needs to find the right balance of secrecy and 
efficiency to carry out its attack.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARING ut1, ut2, A N D ut4 
Appendix A.1: When (13) Holds (Case 2 Is Feasible)
Comparing ut1, ut2, and ut4 is sufficient when Bt/bt ≤ 1 (Property 1) or
when Bt/bt > 1 and vt ≥ Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt ≥ Rt . Note that
ut1 > ut4 ⇔ vt − Rt > 0 ⇔ vt > Rt (A1)
and
ut1 > ut2
⇔ vt − Rt >
(
vt
bt
−
√
Rt
)
(Bt −
√
Rt )
bt (Bt − bt )
⇔
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⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vt >
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)
if
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) (Bt − bt ) > 0
vt <
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)
if
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) (Bt − bt ) < 0
(A2)
ut4 > ut2
⇔ 0 >
(
vt
bt
− √Rt
)
(Bt −
√
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bt (Bt − bt )
⇔
{
vt < bt
√
Rt if (Bt −
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Rt )(Bt − bt ) > 0
vt > bt
√
Rt if (Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) < 0 (A3)
Therefore, ut1 is highest if and only if
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(A4)
And ut2 is highest if and only if
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⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bt
√
Rt < vt <
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)
if(Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) > 0 and
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) (Bt − bt ) > 0
vt > max
{
bt
√
Rt,
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)
}
if(Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) > 0 and
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) (Bt − bt ) < 0
vt < min
{
bt
√
Rt,
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)
}
if(Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) < 0 and
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) (Bt − bt ) > 0
bt
√
Rt
(√
RtbtBt +
√
Rt −
√
Rtb
2
t − Bt
)
(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
) < vt < bt√Rt
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(A5)
And ut4 is highest if and only if:{
vt < min{Rt, bt
√
Rt} if (Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) > 0
Rt > vt > bt
√
Rt if (Bt −
√
Rt )(Bt − bt ) < 0 (A6)
Lemma 1. The parameter combination
(Bt −
√
Rt ) (Bt − bt ) < 0 and(
b2t Bt − b3t − Bt +
√
Rt
)(Bt − bt ) < 0 (A7)
is impossible.
Proof. Assuming Bt > bt implies Bt <
√
Rt < 0 and b2t (Bt − bt ) −
Bt +
√
Rt < 0, which is impossible. Assuming Bt < bt implies Bt >√
Rt and b2t (Bt − bt ) − Bt +
√
Rt > 0, which is impossible. Assuming
Bt = bt causes (A7) not to be satisfied. 
The government is advantaged in case 1, which is possible when the
government’s valuation vt is above a minimum. In contrast, the terrorist is
advantaged in case 4, which is possible when the government’s valuation vt
is below a maximum. Case 2 gives an interior solution where both players
defend and attack.
Appendix A.2: When (13) Does Not Hold (Case 2 Is Not Feasible)
Comparing ut1 and ut4 is sufficient when Bt/bt ≤ 1 (Property 1) or when
Bt/bt > 1 and vt ≥ Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt ≥ Rt . Note that
ut1 > ut4 ⇔ vt − Rt > 0 ⇔ vt > Rt (A9)
Therefore, we have case 1 if (A9) holds and case 4 if (A9) does not hold.
APPENDIX B: COMPARING ut2 AND ut4
Comparing ut2 and ut4 is sufficient when Bt/bt > 1 and vt < Rtbt/Bt .
When (13) holds (case 2 is feasible), we have
ut4 > ut2 ⇔ 0 >
(
vt
bt
− √Rt
)
(Bt −
√
Rt )
bt (Bt − bt )
⇔
{
vt < bt
√
Rt if (Bt −
√
Rt ) (Bt − bt ) > 0
vt > bt
√
Rt if (Bt −
√
Rt ) (Bt − bt ) < 0 (B1)
When (13) does not hold (case 2 is feasible), we have case 4.
APPENDIX C: COMPARING ut2, ut3, A N D ut4
Comparing ut2, ut3, and ut4 is sufficient when {Bt/bt > 1, Rtbt/Bt ≤ vt ≤
Rt} or when {Bt/bt > 1, vt > Rt , Rt (1+bt /Bt )24bt /Bt ≥ vt}. These inequalities
imply ut3 = (√vt −
√
btRt
Bt
)2 > 0 and therefore we only compare ut2 (case 2)
and ut3 (case 3) because ut4 is strictly dominated. We thus get
ut3 > ut2 ⇔
(
√
vt −
√
btRt
Bt
)2
>
(
vt
bt
− √Rt
)
(Bt −
√
Rt )
bt (Bt − bt ) (C1)
where the left-hand side is strictly positive.
Note that we also need (13) to hold in order to get case 2. When (13)
does not hold, we have case 3.
In case 3, the government defends but does not attack, and the terrorist
attacks only; the functional forms are at = 0, dt =
√
Rtvt
Bt bt
− Rt
Bt
, At = Rt/Bt,
Dt = 0, ut = (√vt −
√
btRt
Bt
)2, and Ut = Vt
√
Rtbt
vtBt
.
